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Abstract. AGM’s belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the
study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised
bases) have been primarily used to specify the agent’s belief state. While
the connection of iterated AGM-like operations and their encoding in
dynamic epistemic logics have been studied before, few works considered
how well-known postulates from iterated belief revision theory can be
characterised by means of belief bases and their counterpart in dynamic
epistemic logic. Particularly, it has been shown that some postulates can
be characterised through transformations in priority graphs, while others
may not be represented that way. This work investigates changes in the
semantics of Dynamic Preference Logic that give rise to an appropriate
syntactic representation for its models that allow us to represent and
reason about iterated belief base change in this logic.
1 Introduction
Belief Change is the study of how an epistemic agent comes to change her mind
after acquiring new information. While changes in mental attitudes is a well-
studied topic in the literature, the integration of such changes as operations
within logics of beliefs, obligations, etc. is a somewhat recent development.
Inspired by the Dutch School, several dynamic logics for information change
have been proposed [32,5] which can be connected to the study Belief Change. In
particular, Girard [14] proposes Dynamic Preference Logic (DPL) which has been
applied to study generalisations of belief revision a la AGM [14,15]. Interestingly,
[29] have proposed using DPL as a tool to investigate different classes of belief
change operators.
Belief Base Change is the area that studies Belief Change based on syntac-
tic representations of the agent’s epistemic commitments. The area arises from
Hansson’s [17] criticism of the use of deductively closed sets of formulas to rep-
resent an agent’s epistemic state in the AGM paradigm.Recently, the notion of
belief base has been extended into similar (and more expressive) structures such
as e-bases [28], epistemic entrenchments [27], priority graphs [23] and others.
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While connections between Belief Base Change and Belief Change have been
investigated in the literature [18,9,10], they rely mainly on one-shot changes,
thus, are not able to clarify the behaviour of iterated changes. As such, it is
necessary to establish which formal properties these belief base change operations
satisfy in a dynamic sense, as studied in the literature of Iterated Belief Change
[8,25,19].
The relationship between priority graphs (and similar structures) and prefer-
ence relations has been widely investigated in the literature [3,23]. Logics relating
notions of belief/preference based on syntactic representations, such as priority
graphs, and semantic representations, have been studied before by authors such
as Levesque [20], van Benthem et al. [33] and Lorini [24]. More yet, it has been
shown that several well-known dynamic operators for preference change can be
characterised by means of transformations on such structures [3,33,31].
Souza et al. [30] have taken one step in the direction of connecting Belief Base
Change and Iterated Belief Change by characterising well-known postulates as
conditions that must be satisfied by transformations on priority graphs. These
authors show, however, that an important class of postulates cannot be rep-
resented that way, demonstrating that there is an expressiveness gap between
priority graphs and preference models concerning the dynamic aspects of the
logic.
In this work, we aim to shorten the expressiveness gap between preference
models and priority graphs. We show that for an appropriate restriction of the
class of models, we can provide syntactic structures (called grounded priority
graphs) able to encode all the information contained in a preference model, i.e.
not only the information relative to the ordering among the possible worlds but
also extensional information on which worlds are epistemically possible. As such,
we can study operations of belief change based on preference models as transfor-
mations on grounded priority graphs. As a result, we obtain the representation
of two postulates shown by Souza et al. [30] to not be representable in such a
manner. We also obtain a characterisation of relevant priority graph transforma-
tions, i.e., transformations that may be used to represent belief change operators,
a problem that was left open in previous works, such as [23,31,30].
This work is structured as follows: in Section 2, we present the background
theory on Iterated Belief Change; in Section 3, we present Dynamic Preference
Logic, as well as the relevant connections between preference models and priority
graphs in the literature. We also prove some fundamental representation results,
which strengthen the ones in the literature, based on the definition of preference
model we propose. In Section 4, we employ DPL to study Iterated Belief Change
operators through transformations on priority graphs. In this section, we provide
a characterisation of relevant priority graph transformations, and we use them to
characterise important belief change postulates which could not be represented
by previous methods. Finally, in Section 5, we provide some final considerations,
reflecting on the epistemological limitations of our logic, as well as possible future
work and applications.
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2 Dynamic and Iterated Belief Change
AGM’s work [1] focused on postulating minimal requirements for belief change
operations in order to describe rational ways of changing one’s beliefs.
Among the three basic operations studied by AGM, only expansion can be
univocally defined. The operations of revision and contraction, on the other hand,
are constrained by a set of postulates, usually referred to as AGM postulates,
that define a class of suitable change operators, representing different rational
ways in which an agent can change her beliefs.
It has been argued that AGM’s approach lacks a clear semantic interpreta-
tion. Based on Lewis’ models for counterfactual reasoning [21], Grove [16] pro-
vided a possible-world semantics to AGM operations for a (supraclassical and
monotonic) logic L. He shows that for any belief revision operator ∗ satisfying the
AGM postulates and any belief set B, there is a system of spheres SB = 〈W,≤〉,
in which W is a set of models for the language L, such that w ∈ Min≤W iff
w  B and JB ∗ ϕKSB = Min≤JϕKSB . As such, compliance to AGM’s postulates
can be semantically characterised by postulate Faith below, which states the
the minimal worlds on the revised epistemic state of the agent are exactly the
minimal worlds satisfying a certain property ϕ that the agent has come to believe
to be true, on changes in Grove’s models [25]:
(Faith) w ∈ Min≤JϕK iff w ∈ Min≤∗ϕW
It has been pointed out that AGM belief revision says very little about how
to change one agent’s beliefs repeatedly. In fact, it has been observed that the
AGM approach allows some counter-intuitive behaviour in the iterated case [8].
To remedy this deficiency, Darwiche and Pearl [8] propose a set of additional
postulates that further constrain the behaviour of revision operators. Further-
more, the authors analyse the proposal by Boutilier [6] of Natural Revision. To
model this operation, they propose the postulate of conditional belief minimisa-
tion CB, which states that the conditional beliefs of the agent (which are not
related to the property being revised) are maintained.
(CB) If w,w′ 6∈ Min≤JϕK, then w ≤ w
′ iff w ≤∗ϕ w
′.
Darwiche and Pearl use this postulate to characterise the operation of Natural
Revision showing thus that this is only an example of their broader notion of
iterated belief change.
Definition 1 (Natural Revision) Let ≤ ⊆W ×W be a plausibility relation
and ϕ a propositional formula. The Natural Revision of ≤ by ϕ is the plausibility
relation ≤∗ϕ ⊆W×W satisfying Faith and CB.
Based on criticism by Freund and Lehman [11], Nayak et al. [25], however,
show that DP postulates are incompatible with the original AGM postulates.
To solve this problem, they propose the notion of dynamic revision operator,
in which a belief revision changes not only the belief set of the agent but the
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operation itself, i.e., the agent’s epistemic state. This distinction between static
and dynamic operators has been observed to be relevant in works such as that of
van Benthem [32] and Baltag and Smets [5], or that of Lindstro¨m and Rabinowicz
[22], in which AGM-like static revision can be seen as a counterfactual reasoning
while dynamic revision is modelled as an epistemic action changing the agent’s
epistemic state.
In this work, we explore the characterisation of Belief Change postulates
within Dynamic Preference Logic using both the proof theory of the logic and
its characterisation through transformations on belief bases, understood here
as priority graphs. To do this, in the following section, we introduce Dynamic
Preference Logic, the logic that we will use to reason about Belief Change.
3 Dynamic Preference Logic
Preference Logic is a modal logic of transitive and reflexive frames. It has been
applied to model a plethora of phenomena in Deontic Logic [33], Epistemic
Logic [5], etc. Dynamic Preference Logic (DPL) [14] is the result of “dynami-
fying” Preference Logic, i.e., extending it with dynamic modalities allowing the
study of dynamic phenomena of attitudes such as Beliefs, Obligations, Prefer-
ences, etc.
We begin our presentation with the language and semantics of Preference
Logic, which we will later “dynamify”.
Definition 2 Let P be a finite set of propositional letters. We define the lan-
guage L≤(P ) by the following grammar (where p ∈ P ):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Aϕ | [≤]ϕ | [<]ϕ
We will often refer to the language L≤(P ) simply as L≤ by supposing the
set P is fixed. Also, we will denote the language of propositional formulas by
L0(P ) or simply L0. Girard [14] has proposed a semantics for DPL based on
Kripke frames with a reflexive and transitive accessibility relation. However, as
pointed out earlier, Souza et al. [30] show that for this class of models, some
belief change operators cannot be represented by means of the manipulation of
syntactic representations of these models, presented later in this section. For this
reason, we propose a variation of the notion of preference models that, we show,
possess good representational properties from a dynamic point of view.
Definition 3 A conditionally-grounded preference model is a tupleM=〈W,≤, v〉
whereW ⊆ 2P is a set of possible worlds, ≤ is a a reflexive and transitive relation
over W , and v : P → 2W , s.t. w ∈ v(p) iff p ∈ w, is a valuation function.
In such a model, the accessibility relation ≤ represents an ordering of the
possible worlds according to the preferences of a certain agent. As such, given
two possible worlds w,w′ ∈ W , we say that w is at least as preferred as w′ if,
and only if, w ≤ w′.
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Notice that in Definition 3, we require that W ⊆ 2P , i.e., possible worlds are
possible propositional valuations. This requirement has important expressiveness
consequences for the logic. Particularly, one expressiveness consequence can be
seen in Theorem 7, a stronger version of a representation theorem due to Liu [23].
The choice of restriction in the class of models we present in this work stems
from two reasons: these models are more connected with Grove’s proposal of
models for belief change, in which possible worlds were maximal consistent the-
ories of the logic - in the propositional classical logic case, it is equivalent to valu-
ations - and the fact that, as showed by Andersen et al. [2], for conditional logics
defined over linear preference model, any (linear) preference model is modally
equivalent to a conditionally-grounded (linear) preference model3. From their
work, we also know that the logic of degrees of belief, which can be encoded
within Preference Logic, is more expressive than the logic of conditional beliefs,
which suggests that the restriction on the models has important expressibility
consequences for our logic.
Since, in this work, our investigation only concerns those postulates which
are defined by means of conditions on Grove models, usually based on the notion
of conditional belief, we do not believe this expressive limitation of the logic will
be of great concern. We nevertheless discuss these limitations in our Final Con-
siderations. In the following, we will refer to conditionally-grounded preference
models simply as preference models, for the sake of the presentation.
The interpretation of the formulas over these models is defined as usual. Here,
we only present the interpretations for the modalities, since the semantics of the
propositional connectives is clear. They are interpreted as
M,w  Aϕ iff ∀w′ ∈W : M,w′  ϕ
M,w  [≤]ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈W : w′ ≤ w⇒M,w′  ϕ
M,w  [<]ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈W : w′ < w⇒M,w′  ϕ
As usual, we will refer as 〈≤〉ϕ and 〈<〉ϕ to the formulas ¬[≤]¬ϕ and ¬[<]¬ϕ,
respectively, as commonly done in modal logic. Also, given a model M and a
formula ϕ, we use the notation JϕKM to denote the set of all the worlds in M
satisfying ϕ. When it is clear which model we are referring to, we will denote
the same set by JϕK. Also, as usual, we will refer as M  ϕ to the fact that for
any world w in the model, it holds that M,w  ϕ.
As the concept of most preferred worlds satisfying a given formula ϕ will be
of great use in modelling some interesting phenomena in this logic, we define a
formula encompassing this exact concept.
3 The authors consider only linear models in their work and, a priori, it is not clear
whether their modal equivalence result can be extended to pre-orders in general.
Nevertheless, it indicates that conditionally-grounded models preserve a great deal
of conditional information held in general preference models and, as such, constitute
an interesting subclass of models to be studied for this logic. Our results in this
work only support this conclusion by showing that, for considering this subclass of
models, we can obtain interesting representation results that allow computational
exploration of DPL in diverse areas.
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Definition 4 We define the formula µϕ ≡ ϕ∧¬〈<〉ϕ that is satisfied by exactly
the most preferred worlds satisfying ϕ, i.e., JµϕKM = Min≤JϕKM .
3.1 Preferences and Priorities
The relation between preference relations and their representations as orderings
over formulas (priority orderings, or entrenchment relations) has been extensively
studied in the literature [12,13,3]. Liu [23] explore this relationship to propose
a syntactic representation of preference models, called priority graphs (or P-
graphs for short) which can be used to reason about conditional preferences
in DPL [33]. With this connection, we will be able to investigate well-known
postulates of Iterated Belief Change, defined over preference relations as those
in preference models, using operations on priority graphs, thus connecting belief
base change operations and iterated belief revision.
Definition 5 [23] Let P be a countable set of propositional symbols and L0(P )
the language of classical propositional sentences over the set P . A priority graph
is a tuple G = 〈Φ,≺〉 where Φ ⊂ L0(P ), is a finite set of propositional sentences
and ≺ is a strict partial order on Φ.
It is easy to see that from a priority graph, we can construct a preference
model by taking the preference relation induced by such a graph.
Definition 6 Let G = 〈Φ,≺〉 be a P-graph and M = 〈W,≤, v〉 be a preference
model. We say that M is induced by G iff for any w,w′ ∈ W it holds that
w ≤ w′ iff ∀ϕ ∈ Φ : ((w′  ϕ⇒ w  ϕ) or
∃ψ ∈ Φ : ψ ≺ ϕ, w  ψ, and w′ 6 ψ)
Clearly, given a P-graph G = 〈Φ,≺〉, the relation ≤ satisfying the condition
in Definition 6 is reflexive. Notice that it is also transitive since for any words
w,w′, w′′, if w ≤ w′ and w′ ≤ w′′ then for any ϕ′′ that w′′ satisfies, then either
w′ satisfies it or there is some ϕ′ that w′ satisfies and w′′ doesn’t and ϕ′ ≺ ϕ.
Similarly, since w ≤ w′ there is some ϕ that w satisfies and w′ doesn’t and
ϕ ≺ ϕ′. Notice that, since Φ is finite, we can take the minimal ϕ′ and ϕ for
which these properties hold, from which we can conclude that w′′ cannot satisfy
ϕ, otherwise either w 6≤ w′ or w′ 6≤ w′′. Thus, by transitivity of ≺, w ≤ w′′.
The induction of preference models from P-graphs raises the question about
the relations between these two structures. Liu [23] shows that any preference
frame, i.e., any set of worlds with a reflexive and transitive accessibility relation,
is induced by some P-graph. This result cannot be strengthened to preference
models, however, since by fixing a certain valuation, it is easy to construct a
model for which there is no P-graph that induces it - it suffices to have two
worlds w and w′ which satisfy the same propositional literals and w < w′. Since
no propositional formula can distinguish the world w from w′, no P-graph can
express the order w < w′. Within the class of preference models defined in
this work, we can strengthen further this result showing that any conditionally-
grounded preference model is induced by a P-graph.
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Theorem 7 Any preference model M = 〈W,≤, v〉 is induced by a priority graph
G = (Φ,≺).
Proof. Take CM = {[w] | [w] = {w
′ ∈ W s.t. w′ ≤ w and w ≤ w′}}, we define
the characteristic formula of a cluster [w], the formula ϕ[w] =
∨
w′∈[w]
∧
p∈P p(w
′)
s.t. p(w′) = p if M,w′  p and p(w′) = ¬p, otherwise. With that, construct
GM = 〈Φ,≺〉 on the following way.
– Φ = {ϕ[w] | [w] ∈ CM}
– ϕ ≺ ψ iff there are w,w′ ∈W s.t. M,w  ϕ and M,w′  ψ and w < w′.
Notice that each world w in the model satisfies exactly one formula of Φ and
only worlds in the same cluster, i.e., equally preferable to each other, satisfy
the same formula Φ, since the formula ϕ[w] is a disjunction of the characteristic
formulas ϕw′ of the worlds in the cluster [w]. As such, it clearly holds that for
any w,w′ ∈ W , w ≤ w′ iff either ϕ[w] = ϕ[w′] or ϕ[w] ≺ ϕ[w′]. We call GM the
canonical P-graph inducing M . ⊓⊔
Notice that not necessarily two P-graphs that induce the same preference
model are equal (or isomorphic in some sense), since, as can be easily seen from
Definition 6, any submodel of a preference model induced by some P-graph G is
also induced by G. As such, preference models are underdetermined, in a sense,
by P-graphs and two preference models with substantially distinct canonical
models can be induced by the same P-graph.
Fact 8 Let G = 〈Φ,≺〉 be a P-graph and let also M = 〈W,≤, v〉 be a preference
model induced by G. For any preference model M ′ = 〈W ′,≤′, v′〉 s.t. W ′ ⊆ W ,
≤′=≤|W ′ and v
′ = v|W ′ , M
′ is induced by G.
4 Iterated Belief Change and Dynamic Preference Logic
In this section, we investigate the relationship between the postulates satisfied by
iterated belief change operators discussed in Section 2 and their characterisation
inside Dynamic Preference Logic.
We define a dynamic operation on a preference model as any operation that
takes a preference model and a formula and changes the preference relation of
the model.
Definition 9 [29] We say ⋆ is a dynamic operator on preference models if
for any preference model M = 〈W,≤, v〉 and formula ϕ ∈ L0, we have that
⋆(M,ϕ) = 〈W,≤⋆, v〉. In other words, an operation on preference models is called
a dynamic operator iff it only changes the relation of the preference model. We
will use M⋆ϕ to denote the model ⋆(M,ϕ).
Given a dynamic operator ⋆, we extend the language L≤ with formulas [⋆ϕ]ξ.
Here, we point out some abuse of notation, since we use ⋆ as both a dynamic
operator defined as a function and as a symbol in the object language to define
the modality [⋆ϕ] - which will correspond to the application of this operator ⋆
to the model.
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Definition 10 Let ⋆ be a dynamic operator. We define the language L≤(⋆) as
the smallest set containing L≤ and all formulas [⋆ϕ]ξ, with ϕ ∈ L0 and ξ ∈
L≤(⋆).
Given a preference model M = 〈W,≤, v〉, the semantics of formulas [⋆ϕ]ξ of
L≤(⋆) is as follows
M,w  [⋆ϕ]ξ iff M⋆ϕ, w  ξ
Notice that, in this work, we are only interested in belief changing operators,
i.e., those changing the plausibility the agent attributes to each epistemically
possible world, not creating any new knowledge about the world4.
Liu et al. [23,33] show that some dynamic belief operators can also be de-
scribed by means of changes in the priority graphs representing the agent’s belief
base. In the following, G(P ) denotes the set of all priority graphs constructed
over a set P of propositional symbols.
Definition 11 We call a graph transformation any function † : G(P )×L0(P )→
G(P ).
A P-graph transformation is, thus, a transformation in the agent’s belief
base, as represented by a priority graph. Since P-graphs and preference models
are translatable into one another, it is easy to connect P-graph transformations
and dynamic operators as well.
Definition 12 [30] Let ⋆ be a dynamic operator and † be a P-graph transforma-
tion. We say ⋆ is induced by † if for any preference model M and any P-graph
G, if M is induced by G then the preference model ⋆(M,ϕ) is induced by the
P-graph †(G,ϕ), where ϕ is any propositional formula in L0(P ),
Some difficulties may arise in this connection since the relationship between
P-graphs and preference models is not univocal, as exemplified by Fact 8. We
will deal with some of these difficulties in this section through the definition
of a more suitable syntactic representation of conditionally-grounded preference
models in Subsection 4.2.
Particularly, it is clear that not all P-graph transformations induce dynamic
operators. The reason for this is that, since P-graphs are syntactic representa-
tions of preferences, different P-graphs may induce the same preference models.
As such, if the P-graph transformation changes these equivalent P-graphs in in-
consistent ways, no dynamic operator can satisfy the condition of Definition 12.
For example, a graph transformation that changes the graph p ≺ q into
the graph p ≺ q and the graph p ∧ q ≺ p ∧ ¬q ≺ ¬p ∧ q ≺ ¬p ∧ ¬q into
4 As helpfully pointed out by one of the reviewers, since our agents are introspective
in the sense that agents know about their beliefs, the belief change operations in-
vestigated in this work do change the agent’s knowledge, but only in the sense that
they change their knowledge about their epistemic state, not their knowledge about
the world or current state of affairs. This is an important distinction in the class of
operations studied.
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p∧ q ≺ ¬p∧ q ≺ p∧¬q ≺ ¬p∧¬q cannot induce any dynamic operator since the
original graphs are equivalent, i.e., induce the same models, but the resulting
graphs are not. As such, Souza et al. [30] define the notion of relevant graph
transformation.
Definition 13 [30] We say that a P-graph transformation † is relevant if there
is some dynamic operator ⋆ that is induced by it.
4.1 Characterising relevant graph transformations
While some earlier representation results by Liu [23] guarantee the existence
of relevant P-graphs, Souza et al. [30] did not provide means to identify which
graph transformations are relevant or not. To provide such conditions, we need
to formalise the notion of equivalence between P-graphs discussed above.
Definition 14 Let G1 and G2 be two P-graphs, we say G1 and G2 are ϕ-
equivalent, symbolically G1 ≡ϕ G2, iff they induce the same preference models of
a formula ϕ, i.e., for any preference model M , if M  ϕ, then G1 induce M iff
G2 induce M
The idea of ϕ-equivalence is that two graphs induce the same models when
restricted to a certain class of models - represented by a formula ϕ. Clearly, it
holds that two P-graphs are equivalent (in the sense that they induce the same
models) when they are ⊤-equivalent.
Now, by Proposition 15 below, we have that not only relevant graph trans-
formations preserve ϕ-equivalence between P-graphs, but this is a sufficient con-
dition for a transformation to be relevant. This is a direct consequence of the
Fact 8 presented in Section 3.
Proposition 15 Let † : G(P ) × L0(P ) → G(P ) be a P-graph transformation,
the following statements are equivalent:
1. † is relevant;
2. for any P-graphs G1, G2 and propositional formula ϕ, if G1 ≡ψ G2 for some
propositional formula ψ, then †(G1, ϕ) ≡ψ †(G2, ϕ).
Proof. Notice that the proof that statement 1 implies statement 2 is trivial by
Definition 12. The other implication follows easily by defining for any modelM =
〈W,≤, v〉 and propositional formula ϕ, the result ∗(M,ϕ) =M ′ = 〈W,≤′, v〉 s.t.
≤′ is induced by the graph †(G,ϕ), where G is the canonical P-graph inducing
M . We must show that † induces ⋆, i.e., that for any P-graph inducing M , the
result of its transformation by † must induce M ′.
Take a P-graph G′ that induces M . Take the formula
ψM =
( ∨
w∈W
ϕw
)
∧

 ∧
w∈2P \W
¬ϕw

 ,
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where given a propositional valuation w,
ψw =

∧
p∈w
p ∧
∧
p∈P\w
¬p

 .
Clearly, for any model M ′ = 〈W ′,≤′, v′〉, M ′  ϕM iff W
′ ⊆ W . As such, by
Fact 8, it is easy to see that G ≡ψM G
′. Since † preserves ψM -equivalence, then
†(G,ϕ) ≡ψM †(G
′, ϕ). Since dynamic operators don’t change the set of possible
worlds, clearly M ′  ψM and, as such, it must be induced by G
′. ⊓⊔
While the notion of ϕ-equivalence clarifies the necessary behaviour for a
graph transformation to be relevant, it is yet not completely clear how to decide
whether a transformation preserves ϕ-equivalence. Since, by Fact 8, we know
that a P-graph induces all submodels of some model it induces, to verify if two
graphs are ϕ-equivalent, it suffices to verify if they induce the same model in the
limiting case, i.e., the model containing all and only the valuations that satisfy
ϕ.
Proposition 16 Let G1 and G2 be P-graphs and let ϕ ∈ L0 be a proposi-
tional formula. We have that G1 ≡ϕ G2 iff there is some preference model
M = 〈JϕK0,≤, v〉, where JϕK0 stands for the set of all propositional valuations
satisfying ϕ, s.t. M is induced both by G1 and G2.
Proof (Sketch of the proof). It suffices to see that, given the restriction in the
class of models considered in Definition 3, any model is composed by a subset of
propositional valuations in 2P . As such, for any model M = 〈W,≤, v〉 induced
by a P-graph G, it must be the case that there is a canonical induced model
MG = 〈2
P ,≤G, vG〉 induced by MG s.t. ≤⊆≤G - by Definition 6. From there, it
is easy to see that G1 ≡ϕ G2 iff MG1 =MG2, as defined above, considering only
those valuations that satisfy ϕ in the canonical induced model.
With this result, we have a tool to verify whether a P-graph transformation
is relevant, i.e., induces some dynamic operator. Notice that, since the number
of preference models for a finite set P of propositional symbol is also finite, and
since there is only a finite amount of semantically distinct propositional formulas
over this symbol set, verifying if a graph transformation is relevant is decidable
(and, in fact, exponential on the number of propositional symbols in P ).
4.2 Overcoming P-graphs expressibility gaps
Souza et al. [29] show that the proof theory of DPL can be used to characterise
Belief Change postulates. More yet, they study which postulates can also be
represented by conditions on graph transformations, such as DP-1. We say a
graph transformation satisfies a postulate if all dynamic operators induced by it
satisfy this postulate.
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To characterise belief change postulates using graph transformations, Souza
et al. [30] provide a set of constraints on transformations that guarantee satis-
faction to some postulates.
Unfortunately, the authors also show that some important postulates from
Iterated Belief Revision cannot be characterised by P-graph transformations, as
is the case of CB5. However, Natural Revision, which satisfies postulates Faith
and CB, is definable in DPL.
Fact 17 [30] No relevant P-graph transformation † : G(P ) × L0(P ) → G(P )
satisfies both Faith and CB.
The reason for such a result is that some dynamic operators are defined by
means of the minimal worlds in the model satisfying some property. It has been
shown, however, that such a property cannot be encoded employing P-graphs
[31]. As such, to overcome the expressiveness gap between dynamic operators
and graph transformation, we propose a restriction on the class of models in
DPL semantics (corresponding to the requirement that W ⊆ 2P in Definition 3)
and, below, a variation of the notion of priority graph which, together, guaran-
tee that transformations on priority graphs can appropriately characterise these
postulates.
Definition 18 We call grounded P-graph a structure G = 〈ϕ,Φ,≺〉, s.t. ϕ ∈ L0
is a consistent propositional formula and 〈Φ,≺〉 is a P-graph. We also say that
G is grounded by ϕ.
The main reason for the lack of expressiveness of P-graphs to define dynamic
operations is that a P-graph encodes only information on the structure of the
accessibility relation of the models induced by it. The extension of such a model,
i.e., which worlds are indeed possible, is not encoded within a P-graph. As such,
from the structure of the P-graph, it is not possible to determine which worlds
are minimal in the induced models. In Definition 18, we complement a P-graph
with the information ϕ, which will be used to define exactly which worlds exist
in the induced models.
Definition 19 Let G = 〈ϕ,Φ,≺〉 be a grounded P-graph, we say that the pref-
erence model M = 〈W,≤, v〉 is induced by G iff W = JϕK0 and ≤ is induced by
the P-graph 〈Φ,≺〉.
Notice that, by Definition 19, a grounded P-graph induces exactly one prefer-
ence model in which the possible worlds are exactly the propositional valuations
satisfying the formula ϕ which grounds it. With that addition, we can determine,
based solely on the structure of a grounded P-graph, what are the minimal worlds
5 Other interesting examples have been previously provided by Souza et al. [31], show-
ing that some iterated contraction operators cannot be characterised by P-graphs
transformations, unless when restricted to a special class of preference models, which
they call broad models.
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in the induced model that satisfy some formula. To construct a graph-based cod-
ification for a formula representing such worlds, based on the work of [33], we
will use the notion of maximal paths in a graph.
Definition 20 Let G = 〈ϕ,Φ,≺〉 be a grounded P-graph, σ = 〈ξ1, · · · , ξn〉 be a
maximal chain of nodes in G, and let ψ be a propositional formula, we define the
formula µσ(ψ) representing the minimal worlds in the induced model satisfying
ψ as µσ(ψ) = µ
n
σ(ψ), where:
µiσ(ψ) =


ϕ ∧ ψ if i = 0
ξi ∧ µ
i−1
σ (ψ) if i > 0 and ξi ∧ µ
i−1
σ (ψ) 6⊢ ⊥
µi−1σ (ψ) otherwise
Notice that in Definition 20, the formula µsigma
i(ψ) corresponds to the
maximal (ordered) conjunction of formulas ξj in the path σ = 〈ξ1, · · · , ξn〉 that
is consistent with ϕ and psi. Since all possible worlds satisfying ϕ exist in any
model M induced by a grounded P-graph G = 〈ϕ,Φ,≺〉, if there is a minimal
world inM satisfying ψ, it must satisfy the formula µsigma(ψ) for some maximal
path σ in G. With that, it is easy to construct a propositional formula from a
grounded P-graph that is satisfied exactly by the minimal ψ-worlds in the model
induced by it.
Proposition 21 Let G = 〈ϕ,Φ,≺〉 be a grounded P-graph, let Σ be the set of
all maximal chains of nodes in G, and let M = 〈W,≤, v〉 be the preference model
induced by G. For any world w ∈W , it holds that
M,w  µG(ψ) iff w ∈ Min≤JψK
where µG(ψ) =
∨
σ∈Σ µσ(ψ)
Proposition 21 shows that, differently then what happens for P-graphs by
Fact 30 of [31], grounded P-graphs completely define the minimal worlds of
their induced conditionally-grounded models. Since the aforementioned fact is
used to prove that well-known contraction operators, as well as postulates CB
and Faith, cannot be represented by P-graph transformations, if we consider
grounded P-graphs and conditionally-grounded P-graphs, we can provide a rep-
resentation result for these postulates - and other similar postulates characterised
by minimal worlds in a model.
We do point out that, in this work, we do not allow grounded P-graph trans-
formations to change the grounding of the graph, similar to the condition that
dynamic operators cannot change the set of possible worlds of the model. For-
mally we would need to redefine notions such as P-graph transformation to
reinforce this restriction. For space constraints, however, we will refrain from
doing so.
Finally, we can characterise CB using both the proof theory of DPL and
grounded P-graph transformations.
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Proposition 22 Let ⋆ be a dynamic operator on preference models satisfying
Faith. The operator ⋆ satisfies CB if, and only if, the axiom schemata below
are valid in L≤(⋆).
[⋆ϕ]p ↔ p
[⋆ϕ](ξ ∧ ξ)↔ [⋆ϕ]ξ ∧ [⋆ϕ]ξ
[⋆ϕ]¬ξ ↔ ¬[⋆ϕ]ξ
[⋆ϕ]Aξ ↔ A[⋆ϕ]ξ
[⋆ϕ][≤]ξ ↔ A(µϕ→ [⋆ϕ]ξ) ∧ (¬µϕ→ [≤][⋆ϕ]ξ)
[⋆ϕ][<]ξ ↔ µϕ ∨ ¬µϕ→ (A(µϕ→ [⋆ϕ]ξ) ∧ [<][⋆ϕ]ξ)
[≤][⋆ϕ]ξ → ¬µϕ→ ([⋆ϕ][≤](¬µϕ→ ξ))
[<][⋆ϕ]ξ → ¬µϕ→ ([⋆ϕ][<](¬µϕ→ ξ))
Proof (Sketch of the Proof:). The first implication is straight-forward, by show-
ing that each axiom holds for any preference model M and dynamic operation
⋆ satisfying CB and Faith. It suffices to notice that for any world w, if it is a
minimal ϕ-world, it will become a minimal world in the revised model M⋆ϕ, by
FAITH. If it is not, for any world w′ s.t. w′ ≤ w, it holds that w′ ≤⋆ w, by CB,
and for any minimal ϕ-world w′, w′ < w by FAITH.
The other implication can be easily shown by observing that for any world
in a preference model (in fact, for any set of worlds) there is a propositional
formula ξ that is satisfied only by this world (the worlds in this set). With that,
and the fact that for any propositional formula ξ and dynamic operator ⋆ it
holds in DPL that ξ ≡ [⋆ϕ]ξ, it is easy to use the axioms above to show that if
⋆ satisfies the postulates above, then it satisfies CB and Faith.
Postulate CB can be represented by means of grounded P-graph transfor-
mations in the following way.
Proposition 23 Let † : G(P ) × L0(P ) → G(P ) be a relevant grounded P-
graph transformation. † satisfies CB iff for all grounded P-graph G = 〈ϕ,Φ,≺〉
and propositional formula ψ ∈ L0, it holds that †(G,ψ) is ϕ-equivalent to the
grounded P-graph G′ = 〈ϕ,Φ†,≺†〉 satisfying:
1. For all ξ ∈ Φ, there is some ξ′ ∈ Φ† s.t.
(a) ϕ ∧ ξ ≡ ϕ ∧ ξ′ and
(b) ∀α′ ∈ Φ†, if α
′ ≺† ξ
′ then
α′ ≡ µG(ψ) or
there is α ∈ Φ s.t. ϕ ∧ α ≡ ϕ ∧ α′ and α ≺ ξ;
2. For all ξ′ ∈ Φ†, ξ
′ ≡ µG(ψ) or there is some ξ ∈ Φ s.t.
(a) ϕ ∧ ξ ≡ ϕ ∧ ξ′ and
(b) ∀α ∈ Φ, if α ≺ ξ then there is α′ ∈ Φ† s.t.
ϕ ∧ α ≡ ϕ ∧ α′ and
α′ ≺† ξ
′.
Similarly, we can characterise Faith using grounded P-graph transforma-
tions:
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Proposition 24 Let † : G(P ) × L0(P ) → G(P ) be a relevant grounded P-
graph transformation. † satisfies Faith if for all grounded P-graph G = 〈ϕ,Φ,≺〉
and propositional formula ψ ∈ L0, it holds that †(G,ψ) is ϕ-equivalent to the
grounded P-graph G′ = 〈ϕ,Φ†,≺†〉 satisfying:
1. µG(ψ) ∈ Φ†;
2. For all ξ ∈ Φ, µG(ψ) ≺† ξ.
Notice that while in this work we were able to provide characterisations of
both CB and Faith using grounded P-graphs, giving similar representations
to belief contractions postulates [26] would be considerably more difficult. The
reason for this is that contraction postulates describe constraints that are more
fine-grained than those described by revision postulates. As a result, commonly,
the restrictions imposed by such postulates would be described by properties on
the paths in the resulting grounded P-graph.
Given the space constraints, we will not explore the representation of these
operations in this work, but we do point out that a characterisation of Lexi-
cographic Contraction using P-graphs - which works for our models - has been
provided by Souza et al. [31] in their investigation on contraction operations
using DPL. As such, this codification can provide clues for a characterisation of
the contraction postulates using graph transformations.
5 Final Considerations
This work has investigated changes in the semantics of Dynamic Preference Logic
and Priority Graphs to tackle the expressiveness gap for dynamic properties
between dynamic operators over preference models and P-graph transformations.
As such, this work can be seen as a step further in the attempt to provide a
semantic foundation for the study on Relational Belief Change using Dynamic
Preference Logic, as done by Girard et al. [14,15] and Souza et al. [31,29,30].
Notice that the class of models used in this work is not the same classes used
in previous works [14,29]. As highlighted before, one of the contributions of this
work is precisely investigating an appropriate class of models for DPL that could
give rise to good representation results employing (grounded) priority graphs.
Notice that the class of models used by us is closely related to Grove’s [16]
models of AGM Belief Change.
From an epistemological point of view, since possible worlds are interpreted
as epistemically possible, our models are capable of representing the notion of an
agent having some knowledge about the world (what is epistemically necessary)
and her beliefs regarding the state of the world. The restriction in Definition 3
that W ⊆ 2P states that each possible state of affairs is identified about what
is true on the observable properties of the world (represented by propositional
symbols). This means that the agent cannot conceive two different state of affairs
that are phenomenically identical. This may have important implications in the
representation power of our logic regarding auto-epistemic phenomena. This fact
highlights the importance of investigating introspective phenomena within Belief
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Revision Theory to understand the expressive limitations of the theory and its
postulates.
As future work, we intend to study how our framework connects to the study
of Non-Monotonic Belief Change, as studied by [7]. Since preference models can
be used to define conditional preferences and non-monotonic rules, we believe
our semantic framework is ideal for providing a semantic perspective on the
work of these authors. This connection is important to understand reasoning
about change based on non-monotonic rules, such as in the case of goal-oriented
reasoning in agent programs [34].
We point out that, while we focused on the study of belief changing opera-
tions, specifically those that do not the change the agent’s knowledge about the
world, the results obtained here point to the fact that this framework can be
used to study more general belief change operations, such as Public Announce-
ments and those studied by Girard and Rott by means of General Dynamic
Dynamic Logic programs [15]. It is not clear, however, if this approach could be
connected with the study of more general relation changing operations available
in the literature, such as those studied by Areces et al. [4].
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